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Abstract 
The goal of this project is to provide self-diagnostic capabilities to the thermal 
protection systems (TPS) of fbture spacecraft. Self-diagnosis is especially important in 
thermal protection systems (TPS), where large numbers of parts must survive extreme 
conditions after weeks or years in space. In-service inspections of these systems are 
difficult or impossible, yet their reliability must be ensured before atmospheric entry. In 
fact, TPS represents the greatest risk factor after propulsion for any transatmospheric 
mission [l]. The concepts and much of the technology would be applicable not only to 
the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), but also to ablative thermal protection for 
aerocapture and planetary exploration. 
Monitoring a thermal protection system on a Shuttle-sized vehicle is a daunting 
task: there are more than 26,000 components whose integrity must be verified with very 
low rates of both missed faults and false positives. The large number of monitored 
components precludes conventional approaches based on centralized data collection over 
separate wires; a distributed approach is necessary to limit the power, mass, and volume 
of the health monitoring system. Distributed intelligence with self-diagnosis further 
improves capability, scalability, robustness, and reliability of the monitoring subsystem. 
A distributed system of intelligent sensors can provide an assurance of the integrity of the 
system, diagnosis of faults, and condition-based maintenance, all with provable bounds 
on errors. 
1. Background 
On the morning of February 1,2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke up on re- 
entry. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board concluded that the cause of the 
accident was a piece of insulating foam that fell from the external tank 8 1.7 seconds after 
launch, striking the leading edge of the left wing and fracturing reinforced carbon-carbon 
(RCC) leading edge panel number eight [2]. The foam strike was not detected by the 
crew, nor observed from the ground until detailed review of video and photographs the 
next day [2]. Even after the foam strike was noticed, calculations suggested incorrectly 
that there was no cause for concern. Other methods of inspection were suggested, 
including taking photographs of the Shuttle from ground- and space-based cameras; 
however, detecting a small, black hole in a black panel against black space seems quite a 
challenge. During the 16 days the Shuttle was on orbit, “mission management failed to 
detect the weak signals that the Orbiter was in trouble and take corrective action” [2]. 
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Detecting problems in the thermal protection system (TPS) is no small problem. 
The thermal protection system (TPS) is essential to protect the aluminum Shuttle from 
temperatures near 1640 “C experienced during reentry into the earth’s atmosphere. The 
system is large and complex: the Space Shuttle orbiter is 37 m long with a 27 m 
wingspan and is covered by approximately 24,300 reusable tiles and 2,300 Flexible 
Insulation Blankets (FIB) [3]. The nose and the wing leading edges experience the 
highest temperatures upon reentry therefore Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels are 
used at these locations [3]. A total of 50 RCC panels are found on the Orbiter. 
The thermal protection system represents the greatest risk factor after propulsion 
for any transatmospheric mission [ 11. Any damage to the TPS leaves the Space Shuttle 
vulnerable and could result in the loss of human life as what happened in the Columbia 
accident. Currently no system exists to notify the astronauts or ground control if the 
thermal protection system has been damaged. 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommends “on-orbit inspection . . . 
of the Thermal Protection System” “before return to flight” [2] The research described 
below consists of the preliminary steps leading toward implementing a biomimetic 
distributed sensor network in the thermal protection system of the Space Shuttle fleet and 
succeeding spacecraft. Such a network would provide continuous, real-time, high- 
resolution data on the “health” of this all-important system. Early awareness of the 
damage to Columbia might have allowed its tragic loss to be avoided, either through 
transatlantic abort of the launch (standard procedure in the event of engine failure) or in- 
space repair of the damaged parts. 
Distributed sensor networks are common in biological systems. For example, the 
human skin contains more than 2 million nerve endings, each of which is specialized to 
detect touch, temperature, or pain. Such a system requires cheap, compact, lightweight 
sensors and a network architecture that minimizes the required communication bandwidth 
among sensors (nerve cells) and between the sensors and the brain. The system of 
sensors and their network must provide sufficiently low latency for responses to occur on 
an appropriate timescale, and must provide sufficient spatial resolution to allow 
assessment of the severity and locality of the stimulus. 
This research proposes to develop a similar system of sensors to detect damage to 
the thermal protection system (TPS) of future manned spacecraft. Such a system would 
increase reliability of the spacecraft by providing continuous real-time feedback on the 
state of the TPS. This involves adding a simple microprocessor and several emitter- 
detector pairs to each of the tens of thousands of tiles or other logical units comprising 
the TPS covering the vehicle. Each tile then becomes a network node, with semi- 
autonomous capabilities. 
2. Smart Tile Concept 
fracture within itself, optical temperature measurement at different depths within the tile, 
communication with neighboring tiles, and detection of loss of communication. These 
In the current concept, the baseline capabilities of each tile consist of: detection of 
capabilities may be implemented using fiber optics or other technologies. “Smart Tile” 
technologies are readily adaptable to both tile-based and monolithic ablative TPS. 
Adjacent regions may be considered “logical tiles”, each with independent sensors, 
controllers, and communications. For the rest of the paper, we will use the term “tiles” to 
include both physical tiles (in a tiled TPS) and “logical tiles” in a TPS with continuous 
components. 
The added hardware to each tile consists of a processor, sensors, communications, 
and power. The processors will be commercial off-the-shelf microcontrollers, which may 
be modified for radiation hardening if a suitable rad-hard part cannot be identified. With 
the quantities required, significant economies of scale will be available. These parts are 
very low power (hundreds of microwatts or less), so the entire system of tens of 
thousands of tiles will require only a few tens of watts. Since the communications occur 
over a distance of perhaps 20 centimeters, the optical communication may also be very 
simple and low-power. The weight added to each tile is less than a gram, so the total TPS 
weight increases by a few kilograms. 
Different sensors are appropriate for different TPS materials and applications. 
Compatibility issues include service temperature, thermal expansion, and chemical 
reactivity. Temperature and integrity/fi-acture are likely to be important in all TPS 
applications, but some sensors such as recession are only relevant to ablative TPS. Once 
smart tiles are in place, their processors and communications network can support 
addition of a wide variety of potential sensors to any or all of the tiles. Such additional 
sensors may include active andor passive acoustic sensors for monitoring components 
that are not themselves “smart”. 
The simplest sensors consist of an emitter-detector pair coupled to a continuous 
optical fiber. Continuity of this sensor fiber is lost if the tile is broken. Temperature 
monitoring by optical pyrometry may be achieved through the same fiber, allowing post- 
flight analysis of the TPS performance for more effective and efficient maintenance of 
reusable vehicles. The processor, emitters, and detectors will be permanently attached to 
the inside surface of the tile, next to the hull where the temperature remains moderate, 
4 5 0  “C. 
Adding intelligence to the thermal protection system involves many challenges 
that must be addressed and overcome in order to make the project a success. One 
important consideration is limiting the mass of the added hardware. Figure 1 shows the 
components that must be added to each tile. The orange sensors have the capability of 
monitoring the temperature at specific tile depths. The grey communication links found 
along the bottom of the tile serve as tile-to-tile communication lines that report to the 
processor found at the center of the tile’s base. The green sensor is a continuous optical 
fiber that runs throughout the tile as shown, is coupled to an emitter-detector, and tests 
for tile integrity. In actuality, the fiber will have gradual curves rather than the sharp 
bends pictured in Figure 1. 
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Figure I :  “Intelligent” tile containing sensors and controllers: tile 
integrity (green), temperature (orange), processor (black), and 
communications (gay). 
Failure of the RCC leading edge panel number eight was the proximate cause of loss 
of Columbia [2]. The health of RCC panels must be monitored in the future; however, 
adding “intelligence” to the RCC panels is a special challenge. Owing to their high 
service temperatures and high thermal conductivity, RCC panels do not provide 
conditions where current electronics may be safely housed, even on the inner surface of 
the panels. The solution which currently seems most promising will be investigated: 
using fiber detectors which pass through the RCC panels but are connected to 
emitteddetector pairs in the adjacent tiles. With this strategy, the tile-based network can 
also monitor the health of the RCC panels, while only the optical fibers are exposed to 
the extreme environment of the RCC leading edges and nose cone. Further investigation 
on the compatibility of optical fibers of quartz and other materials, with and without 
surface modification, with RCC materials at temperatures up to 1700 “C is necessary. 
Similar capabilities are being considered for future ultra-high temperature ceramic 
(UHTC) leading edges. Such higher-temperature components may have only sensors 
installed, with processors and network communications removed to a more hospitable 
location nearby. 
3. Smart Tile Sensors 
integrating fiber optics sensors into thermal protection system components. For this 
preliminary work, the Space Shuttle’s silica TPS tiles were chosen for a number of 
reasons. The Shuttle tiles have well-characterized fabrication methods and well- 
characterized performance, allowing for comparison between laboratory tiles and actual 
service data. The fabrication procedure for the Shuttle TPS tiles is publicly available [8- 
1 13, again, allowing for representative laboratory experiments. Finally, the TPS materials 
to be used in future spacecrafi are not yet well defined: even the balance between ablative 
and reusable TPS components is not yet determined. 
Laboratory experiments were undertaken to demonstrate the feasibility of 
The following sections describe the procedure used to fabricate Space Shuttle 
TPS tiles for service, followed by the procedures used in the laboratory experiments, the 
testing performed, and the results of the experiments on silica TPS tiles with co-fired 
fiber-optic sensors. 
3.1 Background on Space Shuttle Thermal Protection System 
to-earth entry temperature and heat loads [3]. The highest temperatures occur on the nose 
cone and the leading edges of the wings. These areas are protected with reinforced 
carbon-carbon composites (RCC). The surface temperatures in these regions may reach 
1500 - 1650 "C [4,5]. The largest portion of the Orbiter's TPS originally consisted of 
almost 3 1,000 ceramic tiles bonded to the shuttle using nylon felt strain insulator pads 
[4]. However, over time many of these tiles have been replaced by approximately 2,300 
Flexible Insulation Blankets [6]. 
The primary goal of the Thermal Protection System (TPS) is to limit the peak space- 
Each ceramic tile are made from either High Temperature Reusable Surface 
Insulation (HRSI) or Low Temperature Reusable Surface Insulation (LRSI). The High 
Temperature Reusable Surface Insulation (HRSI) consists of LI-900, LI-2200, or FRCI- 
12 material coated with black borosilicate glass for high emittance. HRSI is used in areas 
that receive temperatures between 650°C and 1260"C, which are typically the lower 
surfaces of the Shuttle. The LI-900 and LI-2200 materials are entirely made of silica 
with average densities of 9 lb/R3 (140.16 kg/m3) and 22 lb/R3 (352 kg/m3), respectively. 
Areas requiring greater strength, such as door hinges, use LI-2200 tiles [7]. FRCI-12 is a 
composite insulation composed of silica fibers and aluminum-borosilicate fibers with a 
density of 12 cubic pounds per cubic foot [8]. Low Temperature Reusable Surface 
Insulation (LRSI) is used in areas that receive temperatures between 400°C and 65OOC 
[5], and it is made of LI-900 with a white borosilicate coating [7]. They are coated white 
to limit solar heating and are typically used on the upper surfaces. About 80% of all the 
tiles are LI-900 [4]. 
The silica tiles are made from a very high purity amorphous silica fiber 
approximately 1.2 to 4 microns in diameter and 1/8 inch long [4]. The fiber is 
manufactured by Johns Manville and called Q-Fiber [9]. The silica tiles are 93% void, 
which makes them excellent insulators, with thermal conductivities as low as 0.01 7-0.052 
W/m*K. The amorphous silica gives the tiles a low coefficient of expansion as well as a 
low modulus, and this eliminates any problems with thermal-stress and thermal-shock 
[ 5 ] .  Crystalline forms of silica have a coefficient of thermal expansion over thirty times 
higher than that of amorphous silica [lo]. 
This requires only the purest materials to be used and great care must be taken to 
avoid contamination during processing. Any impurities or contaminations during the 
production can cause crystallization of the material [9]. The most important feature of 
the silica fiber is its chemical composition. The fiber must not have an impurity content 
greater than 0.3% and the total alkali and alkaline earth content must be less than 0.06% 
[111. 
The manufacturing process is lengthy and tightly controlled. First, the fibers are 
washed in dilute hydrochloric acid and then rinsed with deionized water. Next a binder is 
added to the fibers and the mixture is blended with water in a V-blender for 30-60 
minutes, while the pH is held at a constant 9.0 using ammonium hydroxide. The binder 
is made by suspending fbmed silica and starch in deionized water and ammonium 
hydroxide [9], although the binder may, in fact, not be necessary to achieve the required 
properties [12]. This is done with controlled amounts and ratios to maintain the correct 
pH. The blended mixture is then poured into a mold and rapidly pressed at 69- 138 Wa 
[91. 
The resultant tile is then placed in an oven and the temperature is raised at 11°C per 
hour until 150°C. The total drylng time is 18 hours. The tiles are then immediately 
placed in a b a c e  that is free of alkali or alkaline earth oxide impurities. The 
temperature is raised at 150°C per hour or less until 1200-1300°C is reached [9]. After 
the tile is fired, it is x-rayed to test for voids and to assure that it is still amorphous. If it 
passes inspection, it moves to the next stages of manufacture and is machined to its 
desired shape [ 131. 
3.2 Laboratory Experiments 
Sample Preparation 
as used in actual TPS tiles, Johns Manville Q-Fiber. The Q-Fiber was washed with water 
and then pressed into a rectangular shape using two ceramic discs. In the preliminary 
tests, no binder was used; however, the binder may not be necessary [ 121. Quartz fibers 
of various diameters were placed through the middle of some samples, while some 
samples without fibers were also produced as control specimens. The fibers were used 
with the as-delivered surface finish. A heat treatment profile similar to that used by 
Lockheed was used to create the samples. 
The samples were prepared for preliminary testing from the same precursor material 
A total of 32 samples of various sizes and fiber loadings were produced and tested. 
Testing Procedure 
Three-point bending tests were performed on samples approximately 3 cm x 5 cm x 
0.5 cm using an Instron mechanical tester running under computer control. The test setup 
is pictured in Figures 2 and 3. Clearly visible are the sample, 3-point bend apparatus, and 
one ernitteddetector pair for each of the two fibers in the sample. This sample contains 
the largest diameter of fibers tested, and was chosen for display because the fibers are 
visible in the photograph. 
A load cell monitored the force on the crosshead, while a linear voltage displacement 
transducer (LVDT) monitored the position of the crosshead. These outputs were 
connected to a PC-based data logging and control system. 
The continuity of the fiber in the sample was monitored optically during the test. 
Each fiber was connected to a light emitting diode (LED) on one end and to a silicon PIN 
photodiode on the other end. Beads of quartz glass were melted onto the ends of the 
fibers to improve the optical coupling to emitter and detector. The output of the 
photodiode was connected to an amplifier to produce a voltage proportional to the 
intensity of light transmitted through the fiber. The amplifier output voltage was 
connected to an analog-to-digital converter board in the computer data acquisition 
system, and was recorded along with the force and displacement data. 
The tests were performed under constant crosshead speed of 0.5 mm/sec until after 
fracture of the sample. 
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Figure 2: Three-point bend specimen and test fixture. The glass fibers 
carry lightfiom the LED’S (blue mount) to the photodiodes (black mount) 
while thefibers remain unbroken. The intensity of the transmitted light is 
monitored by the wires from the photodiode. 
Figure 3: Test sample after fracture. The photodiode current indicates 
that the fibers break when the tile breaks. 
Results and Discussion 
The load and displacement of a typical test is plotted in Figure 4 with the photodiode 
output voltage of two fibers. The load displays a fairly sharp maximum as the bottom of 
the tile (loaded in tension) fractures, with a broad decay due to the fibrous nature of the 
matrix material. Comparison with the fiber continuity signal indicates that fiber 2 
fractured just at the maximum load (as expected), while fiber 1 broke at a few millimeters 
more displacement. Many of the tests showed similar behavior. This result indicates the 
need for a better understanding of bonding between the fiber and matrix. 
A series of tests shows no effect of even the largest detector fibers tested on the 
flexural strength of the composite specimens. 
The fracture surface of one of the test specimens was imaged by scanning electron 
microscopy, and is pictured in Figure 5. The matrix of fine fibers of amorphous silica 
and a single large detector fiber are clearly visible. This detector fiber shows a very 
small pull-out length, approximately 0.2 mm, indicating very good bonding between the 
detector fiber and the matrix. However, the range of pull-out lengths observed in 32 tests 
is about 0.2 to 7 mm, so improvement in the strength and consistency of the fiber-matrix 
bond is essential. 
32 tests on specimens of TPS tile material with and without detector fibers were 
performed. These tests showed that the detector fibers could accurately and continuously 
determine the structural integrity of the specimen. However, there was a large variation 
in the sample displacement at which the fibers broke, even within the same specimens. 
This variation demonstrates the need for further study of the interface between fiber and 
matrix. 
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Figure 4: Results of a typical three-point bend test conducted at a 
constant crosshead displacement rate of 0.5 mm/sec. The sample 
fractures at a force of 8.2 N andfiber 2 fractures at the same time. Fiber 
I fractures at a slightly larger displacement. 
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Figure 5: Electron micrograph of the fracture suqace of a sample tile 
after testing. This detectorJiber was very well bonded to the matrix, 
although other samples show a wide variation. 
4. Smart Tile Networks: Communication and Distributed Decision-making 
by communication links. The core tasks of the smart tile sensor network are the 
detection, verification, classification, and timely notification of tile damage, tile 
misalignment, and missing tiles. To detect tile damage each tile is instrumented with a 
processor and one or more of the optical temperature and tile fracture sensors described 
previously. Tile misalignment and missing tiles are detected via the optical 
communication links that interconnect the tile’s processors. Besides transferring message 
packets, the communication links are designed to be able to detect and distinguish 
misaligned and missing tiles from communication failures. To reduce the incidence of 
false alarms, failures detected by the sensor network are first communicated locally to 
neighbor sensors, which coordinate to verify and classify the severity of the failure. A 
simple yet robust randomized message routing protocol is then used to route a damage 
summary report through a Network Access Point (NAP) to the vehicle’s main computers, 
where the report is either stored or communicated to the vehicle’s pilots and ground 
control, depending on its severity. To minimize missed detections the smart tile 
network performs continuous self-monitoring from power-up to power-down. 
The smart tile concept consists of a network of sensors and processors interconnected 
4.1 Smart Tile Network Architecture 
in Figure 6. Based on the current Space Shuttle design, Figure 6 shows a TPS consisting 
of two types of tiles (non-critical and critical) and RCC panels. As shown in Figure 6, 
non-critical tiles contain a processor and temperature/fracture sensors, critical tiles 
contain multiple redundant processors and temperature/fracture sensors, and RCC panels 
have temperature/fracture sensors only. Processors are connected to their immediate 
neighbors by communication links. We propose optical communication links, with 
optical fibers that are optically aligned, but not physically continuous across the tile 
boundaries. The innovation of this design is that by monitoring the performance of the 
communication system, it is possible to detect and distinguish misaligned and missing 
tiles from communication failures. 
The major components of the smart tile sensor network are schematically illustrated 
4.2 Communication and Routing 
neighbors to form a lattice topology. Interspersed throughout the lattice are also a 
number of network access points (NAPs) whose purpose is to collect the alerts being 
communicated by the smart tiles and monitor the health of the sensor network. The 
NAPs are where the vehicle’s electronics infrastructure interfaces to the smart tile sensor 
network. The number of hull penetrations is therefore related to the number of NAPs. 
The communication links interconnect the processors to their immediate nearest 
Packet-Based Messaging. 
We propose a simple packet based messaging protocol in which tile damage alerts 
and network health test probes are sent hop-by-hop between the processors and NAPs. 
Each message packet contains the message source address, destination address, message 
type, and message payload. Standard techniques (e.g., CRC) are used to detect and 
correct communication errors. 
Comm. links a- I \  Processor nodes A 
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Figure 6: Schematic of the smart tile sensor network architecture. 
Randomized Routing, 
For communicating tile damage alerts from the tiles to a NAP, a simple randomized 
routing protocol can provide an efficient and robust method. In particular, by encoding 
each processor and NAP with its (x, y) coordinate location each processor then knows its 
relative position within the lattice. Then, for example, a processor at location (x, y) 
forwarding a message to location (x’, y’), where X‘ > x and y’ > y, will forward the 
message to a randomly selected neighbor with a probability biased to move the message 
closer to its intended destination, Le., to a neighbor with larger x or larger y location in 
the lattice. 
With such a randomized routing protocol, messages are forwarded in the “right” 
direction most of the time, but the routing protocol also occasionally allows a message to 
be forwarded in the “wrong” direction, see Figure 7. Such a randomized routing scheme 
enhances reliability since it can ensure (1) that a message is not lost if it encounters 
damaged tiles or broken communication links that cannot communicate anymore, and (2) 
that a message eventually reaches its destination if a path exists to the destination. 
Moreover, this fault-tolerance is obtained without the need for routing tables or 
complicated routing table updates after processor or link failure. 
The cost of occasionally forwarding a message in the “wrong” direction is a marginal 
increase in the expected number of hops needed to route a message from a given source 
location to a given destination location. For instance, in a 30 x 30 lattice (900 tiles), 
where 90% of the messages are forwarded in the “right” direction and 10% of the 
messages are forwarded in the “wrong” direction, the hop count is only 24% higher than 
the minimum number of hops (in an N x M lattice the minimal number of hops is N+M- 
2). This marginal reduction in performance is more than compensated by increased 
robustness. Considering again a 30 x 30 lattice and assuming a certain probability of 
.. 
communication error, in which case the message has to be resent in a new direction, the 
expected hop count increases only slowly. In particular, with a 5% probability of 
communication error, the increase in the expected number of hops is only 5%. For 10, 15 
and 20% probability of communication error the increase in hop count is 1 1, 18 and 25% 
respectively. Since the anticipated error probabilities for the communication network are 
well under 1 %, the unrealistically high error probabilities in these calculations clearly 
illustrate the robustness of our randomized routing scheme. 
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Figure 7 Randomized message routing. Arrow length indicates 
probability, i.e., with small probability a message gets routed in the 
“wrong” direction. 
4.3 Error detection (verification and classification) 
The approach used for error detection is different for non-critical tiles and critical 
tilesRCC panels. While damage or loss of a few non-critical tiles does not jeopardize the 
integrity of the TPS, damage or loss to just a single critical tile could greatly increase the 
risk of vehicle loss on reentry. Because of the difference in the importance, non-critical 
and critical tiledpanels are instrumented differently. Each non-critical tile is monitored 
by a single processor and a single temperature/fracture sensor. Each critical tile/panel, on 
the other hand, is monitored by multiple processors and multiple temperature/fracture 
sensors. Detected problems must be classified as maintenance issues or emergency 
issues. Given that a detected problem could result in mission abort, extremely high 
confidence in the sensor network is a necessity. Therefore, minimal false alarm 
probability and missed detection probability are the main objectives for any monitoring 
system. These objectives are achieved by sensor coordination and information fusion. 
Information Fusion in Non-Critical Tiles. 
There are two ways failures are detected in non-critical tiles. The first one is the self- 
detection of an internal error, meaning that a sensor detects damage in the tile or a failure 
in its communication or sensor capabilities. The second involves processors periodically 
checking their neighbors to see if they are “alive” and functioning properly. A detected 
failure in either case results in the election of an Alert Coordinator (AC). The role of the 
AC is to attempt to verify the failure by collecting further information. This is done by 
instructing the other neighbors of the faulty tile to verify its status, The AC then fuses the 
information and sends a report to a NAP. 
There are two reasons for using an AC instead of just sending every piece of 
information to a NAP. First, the information is locally verified and is sent as one 
information packet to a NAP. This helps to reduce network traffic and less evaluation 
work is needed after the information reaches the NAP. Second, the false alarm 
probability can be reduced significantly. For example, suppose an AC finds that it cannot 
communicate with one of its neighbors. The processor could wrongly conclude that the 
tile is missing. But by querying the tile’s other neighbors the AC can reduce the 
probability that its communication failure is due to a missing tile. Specifically, if the 
probability of communication link failure p = 0.01, then without coordination the 
probability of falsely reporting a missing tile would equal p = 0.01, since the AC acting 
alone would not be able to distinguish a missing tile from a failed communication link. 
However, by merging the information from four neighbor tiles, the probability falsely 
concluding a tile is missing (assuming independent communication error) is equal to 
p4=1x10-8; a four order of magnitude reduction in false alarm probability. 
Information Fusion in Critical Tiles and Panels. 
Detected problems with a critical tile or panel must be handled with very high priority 
as they may indicate a potential emergency. But also failures in communication links, 
sensors or processors have to be double checked, since they are crucial for the confidence 
of the report. To acquire additional information each critical tile and RCC panel has 
multiple redundant integrity sensors. When a failure is detected, one processor is elected 
as a Cluster Leader (CL). The CL may be a processor in the tile where the failure is 
detected, or as in the case of RCC panels, may be in an adjacent tile. A CL not only 
detects failures through its own sensor, but is also the point of contact for information 
gathered by the other sensors and processors in its cluster. Using, for example, simple 
majority vote, information on damage and failures is hsed by the CL and reported to a 
NAP. The more independent sensors that are available, the more reliable the voting 
scheme is in reducing false alarms and missed detections. In case of a failure of the CL 
itself, a neighboring processor would detect the CL failure and would then take over the 
role as a CL. 
Sel f-Moni toring 
The worst situation is to have an alarm system that has failed and to not know that the 
alarm is not functioning. Confidence in the smart tile sensor network, therefore, requires 
constant checking of its hctionality. The central mechanism for doing this is for 
processors to periodically “ping” the status of their neighbors. Any detected errors are 
verified, classified, and communicated to a NAP as described previously. As an 
additional independent check of the lattice, the NAPs are not only recipients of messages 
from the processors, but the NAPs can also actively query individual tiles along selected 
routes through the lattice. In this way, the NAPs can obtain a check of the network’s 
health and topology. 
Additional Features 
The speed and reliability of a routing mode can be further improved by sending 
messages to more than one NAP. This not only reduces latency, but also reduces the 
probability of message loss when large portions of the network are out of service due to 
tile damage or for some other reason (e.g., power failure). There is, of course, a trade-off 
between network traffic and number of NAPS to which the message is sent. Other 
extensions to the concept could include the recording of tile temperature histories for 
maintenance scheduling and possibly vehicle attitude control during reentry. 
4.4 Computational Test Bed and Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation 
and communication links will be emulated using a grid-computing cluster. A variety of 
scenarios and topologies will be evaluated. In addition, the parameter settings for the 
randomized routing protocol will be optimized taking into consideration network 
bandwidth, message size, lattice topology, number and distribution of NAPS, expected 
number of tile failures and their expected spatial distribution as well as errors in message 
transmission. Finally, to test the hardware concept, we propose to manufacture -10 tiles 
with real processors, sensors, and communication links and integrate them with the grid- 
computing cluster for hardware-in-the-loop test and evaluation. 
To test the proposed system a network of 26,000+ tiles with their processors, sensors, 
5. Conclusions 
is a challenging problem, but is an essential capability for future manned spacecraft. 
Smart materials and components such as those described here are a very promising part 
of the solution to this problem. Fiber-optic sensors meet many of the requirements for 
this application, including a high service temperature, low power, and low mass. 
In-situ assessment of the condition of the thermal protection system in near real-time 
Distributed sensing with local intelligence and distributed decision-making is critical 
to meeting the constraints on mass, power, and volume for the entire condition- 
monitoring system. Many locations within and adjacent to the TPS have environments 
benign enough to support current electronics, and the range of suitable locations will 
increase with the availability of higher-temperature electronics. 
In summary, smart tiles will play an important role in improving the safety, 
reliability, and serviceability of future spacecraft. 
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